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Abstract 4	
Background: One Health (OH) is an interdisciplinary approach aiming to achieve 5	
optimal health for humans, animals and their environments.	Case reports and 6	
systematic reviews of success are emerging, however discussion of barriers	and	7	 enablers	of	cross-sectoral	collaboration	are	rare.  8	
Methods: A four-phase mixed-method Delphi survey of Australian human and 9	
animal health practitioners and policymakers (n=52) explored areas of consensus and 10	
disagreement over: (i) the operational definition of OH; (ii) potential for cross-11	
sectoral collaboration; and (iii) key priorities for shaping the development of a OH 12	
response to significantly elevated zoonotic disease risk.  13	
Findings: Participants agreed OH is essential for effective infectious disease 14	
prevention and control, and on key priorities for outbreak responses, but disagreed 15	
over definitions and the relative priority of animal health and welfare and economic 16	
considerations.  17	
Interpretation: Strong support emerged among Australian experts for a OH 18	
approach. There was also recognition of the need to ensure cross-sectoral differences 19	
are addressed. 20	
 21	
  22	
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Introduction  23	
Emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases [EIDs] are an unpredictable, 24	
continuing threat to human, animal and ecological health. They are characterized by 25	
complex causes, consequences and potential solutions that critically limit the 26	
effectiveness of scientific and technocratic approaches to governance.1,2 EID crises 27	
create major issues for distribution of scarce resources, access to health services and 28	
global health security. Historically, EIDs have been managed in overlapping, 29	
uncoordinated, disciplinary silos.3  However, since they are largely driven by human 30	
behaviours and human structures in the context of human-animal interactions, the 31	
effectiveness of traditional sectoral approaches has been limited.  32	
 33	
“One Health” [OH] is the preferred approach to responding to EIDs. OH is based on 34	
recognition of the interdependence of human, animal and ecological health and an 35	
assumption that cross-sectoral integration of expertise, research methodologies and 36	
public health infrastructure increases the capacity for anticipating disease risk and 37	
effective intervention.4,5 The OH literature emphasises the benefits,3,6,7 but there has 38	
been little attempt to identify and assess barriers to and enablers of cross-sectoral 39	
collaboration.8-11 Possibly this is because the need for an OH response seems obvious. 40	
 41	
Against this background, OH advocates are concerned that early collaborations have 42	
not included all relevant disciplines8,12 especially experts from social, ecological and 43	
environment health sciences.13,14 Moreover, despite almost two decades of 44	
interdisciplinary advocacy by international agencies and national governments, OH 45	
still means different things to different people (Text Box 1).15 It remains an ‘umbrella 46	
concept’ for a variety of expert perspectives and disciplinary agendas. This raises 47	
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concerns about the capacity and willingness of different professional groups to 48	
collaborate5,16,17 and the extent to which various sectoral priorities can be aligned, 49	
during EID response planning.18-20 50	
Text Box 1: Current definitions of One Health  51	
 52	
 53	
The conceptual ambiguity of OH could actually diffuse political tensions between 54	
competing sectoral agendas, allowing them to work together.17 Nevertheless, lack of 55	
evidence about how different sectors understand OH, their roles and responsibilities 56	
and how they pursue their priorities, could limit collaboration and its benefits. 57	
Because resources are limited, prioritisation and resource allocation require political 58	
decisions, based on ethical principles, about what is valued, what must be protected 59	
and what is dispensable.  60	
 61	
In this paper we report the results of a modified Delphi survey from a larger study, 62	
which aims to elicit the values underpinning OH and develop guidance for 63	
One	Health	is	…		
§ “…a collaborative, international, cross-sectoral, multidisciplinary 
mechanism to address threats and reduce risks of detrimental infectious 
diseases at the animal-human-ecosystem interface.” Food and Agriculture 
Organization 
§ “…a collaborative and all-encompassing way to address, when relevant, 
animal and public health globally.’ World Organization for Animal 
Health [OiE] 
§ “…the collaborative effort of multiple health science professions, together 
with their related disciplines and institutions – working locally, nationally, 
and globally – to attain optimal health for people, domestic animals, wildlife, 
plants, and our environment.” The One Health Commission  
§ The One Health concept recognizes that the health of humans is connected to 
the health of animals and the environment. US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention  
§ “…a worldwide strategy for expanding interdisciplinary collaborations and 
communications in all aspects of health care for humans, animals, and the 
environment”  The One Health Initiative  
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practitioners and policymakers. We employed mixed methods to explore areas of 64	
sectoral consensus or disagreement on: how OH should be defined; the potential for 65	
cross-sectoral collaboration in Australia; and key priorities that should shape 66	
development of an OH response to a zoonotic EID emergency, when knowledge of its 67	
nature, scale and scope is absent or fluid.   68	
 69	
Methods  70	
Participants 71	
A heterogeneous and geographically dispersed group of experts in human and 72	
veterinary medicine, health law and wildlife ecology and representatives of 73	
agricultural industries and animal welfare/protection organisations were invited to 74	
participate in this survey. We defined ‘experts’ as individuals with knowledge and 75	
experience of EID risks and outbreaks among humans and animals.21 Sampling was 76	
purposive, to ensure representation of traditional OH stakeholders. Potential 77	
participants were identified through institutional websites and researchers’ 78	
professional networks.  79	
 80	
Delphi processes 81	
The rationale of Delphi surveys is that group consensus about contentious issues is 82	
more valid than individual opinions.22 Anonymous data are collected from 83	
individuals, collated and then re-presented to the group to elicit further responses.21 In 84	
this study we analysed data iteratively in parallel with data collection. Rather than 85	
force consensus, we employed a modified technique that allows participants to 86	
explain their views. Except for early discussions about OH definitions (Round [R] 87	
2/Q1), consensus ‘cut offs’ (i.e. fixed levels of agreement) were not employed to limit 88	
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the choices available to survey participants. Otherwise, participants were asked to 89	
judge and respond to the levels of consensus/disagreement that emerged from each 90	
round to provide greater insight into the operational relevance of OH. Participants 91	
who completed each round were invited to participate in the next, but were free to 92	
withdraw at any time. We used an online survey platform [Limesurvey]. 93	
 94	
In R1, we asked participants about their understanding of OH and to respond to three 95	
hypothetical scenarios, each describing a substantially elevated risk of a significant 96	
EID event in Australia. Scenarios [available in online materials] were adapted, with 97	
permission, from a similar study in Singapore (see acknowledgements). Responses 98	
were analysed qualitatively and coded thematically by two authors (CD and JJ) using 99	
framework analysis, a matrix-based method for ordering and synthesizing textual 100	
data.23 During rounds 2-4, participants’ comments, key arguments and levels of 101	
consensus from previous rounds, were presented as quotations, bar charts and 102	
summaries of qualitative findings, taking care to weigh different opinions and 103	
arguments equally. Individual comments were de-identified.  104	
 105	
Additional data and comments were collected, using Likert scales and free text 106	
responses. On completion of each round, participants’ Likert scores were tabulated 107	
and free text answers analysed qualitatively, as described. The final stage of analysis 108	
during preparation of this report drew on the knowledge and professional experience 109	
of the research team. 110	
 111	
To aid analysis, each participant was allocated to a disciplinary/sectoral category - 112	
animal or human health - based on their qualifications and current responsibilities. 113	
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Consistent with previous reports that ecologists and environmental scientists are 114	
poorly represented in OH discourse,12,14 participants from these disciplines all 115	
occupied positions within the animal health sector, and were allocated accordingly. 116	
This study was approved by the [Blinded] Research Ethics Committee. 117	
 118	
Results  119	
Participants:  120	
Email invitations were sent to 85 potential participants, of whom 52 (61%) from a 121	
range of relevant OH roles, disciplines and geographic regions, responded [Table 1]. 122	
Invitations included an individualized link to the online survey, through which 123	
participant consent was obtained.   124	
 125	
As expected, the panel size gradually decreased as participants withdrew,24 but the 126	
balance between human and animal health sectors and characteristics of participants 127	
remained substantially constant [Table 1]. The final round was run at the request of 128	
participants who were keen to give further feedback on the findings.   129	
 130	
Responses to questions on how OH should be defined: 131	
Seven statements describing OH were compiled from participants’ responses to 132	
questions about the nature of OH. In R2, they were asked to indicate the extent to 133	
which they agreed/disagreed with these statements [Supplementary materials]. To 134	
focus discussion, we applied a cut off of >65% agreement. The three statements that 135	
met or exceeded this threshold, were presented to participants in R3, namely: 136	
1. The inter-relationship between human, animal and environmental health [A] 137	
2. The integration of human, animal and environmental health [B] 138	
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3. Cross-disciplinary collaboration and communication between veterinary, 139	
medical and ecological sciences and relevant government agencies [D] 140	
Participants were asked to indicate, with reasons for their choice, which statement 141	
best reflected their view of OH [Table 2].   142	
 143	
Key differences (as revealed in comments) were the extent to which participants 144	
considered OH to be: a concept for understanding linkages between human, animal 145	
and environmental health (statement 1); an emerging integrative discipline (statement 146	
2); or a political initiative to promote cross-disciplinary collaboration (statement 3). 147	
Several participants regarded none of these statements as satisfactory, citing the 148	
limited importance given to the environment in current discourse. One participant 149	
commented:  150	
DP	#26	-	The	problem	at	the	moment	with	the	way	many	people	in	the	151	
veterinary	and	human	health	fields	use	the	term	'One	Health'	is	that	it	152	
focuses	on	human	and	terrestrial	animal	health	i.e.	zoonoses,	and	excludes	153	
the	other	organisms	(plants,	fish)	and	their	interactions	with	the	154	
environment.	…	If	we	are	serious	about	a	concept	of	'One	Health'	then	it	155	
needs	to	be	used	to	describe	the	interactions	and	interrelationships	across	all	156	
organisms	and	the	environment	otherwise	it's	not	'One	Health'	157	
 158	
In R4, participants were shown a representative sample of comments and given the 159	
opportunity to change their position. Table 2 shows that support (in relative terms) 160	
drifted from statement 2 to statement 3. Participants who still preferred statement 2 in 161	
R4 were all aligned with the animal health sector. Otherwise, disciplinary background 162	
appeared not to influence how participants defined OH.   163	
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 164	
These results revealed the difficulty of arriving at a consensus definition of OH, 165	
despite considerable cross-disciplinary agreement. Substantively, the three statements 166	
are very similar; the key tension is whether OH is a means to reach an holistic 167	
understanding of EID threats or a road map for effective cross-sectoral responses. 168	
Comments from R3 and R4 (Table S1 Supplementary data) suggested that 169	
participants who preferred statement 1 were resistant to disciplinary integration or 170	
specific outcomes, whereas those who preferred statement 3 were more pragmatic and 171	
focused on cross-sectoral collaboration as the key driver of a successful OH approach.     172	
 173	
Responses to questions on cross-sectoral collaboration 174	
In R2 we asked participants to indicate on a Likert Scale their (dis)agreement with the 175	
statement in Text box 2. 176	
Text	Box	2	
When	faced	with	possible	multiple	unexpected	animal-to-human	disease	
transmissions	 in	 Australia,	 Federal	 and	 State	 Departments	 [Health,	
Primary	 Industries,	 and	 the	 Environment],	 The	 Australian	 Health	
Protection	 Principal	 Committee,	 The	 Office	 of	 Health	 Protection,	 The	
Communicable	 Diseases	 Network	 Australia,	 Animal	 Health	 and	 Public	
Health	 Laboratories,	 and	 Biosecurity	 Agencies	 would	 rapidly	 be	 in	
communication	and	would	collectively	develop	a	plan	to	limit	the	impact	
of	such	a	zoonosis.	
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Just over two-thirds of participants agreed; the statement was most strongly endorsed 177	
by human health sector participants. Those from the animal health sector were more 178	
pessimistic or unsure about the immediate prospects for cross-sectoral collaboration 179	
(Figure 1).  180	
Insert Figure 1 181	
To explore these positions we constructed a list of potential barriers to OH 182	
approaches, from participants’ responses to R1 scenarios. Figure 2 shows the extent to 183	
which R2 participants agreed or disagreed with each.  184	
Although participants were generally optimistic that different sectors would work 185	
together during a significant EID outbreak, we were surprised by how strongly they 186	
believed that most barriers were likely to impede an OH response.  187	
Insert Figure 2 188	
A comment from one participant [R3] illustrates this:  189	
DP #46 - … there are quite a number of issues preventing an optimal 190	
response to a major zoonotic disease outbreak. It will require additional 191	
resources and plenty of planning and training (including a merging of 192	
cultures) to provide the sort of response we should expect. … This does NOT 193	
mean we should abandon the process of One Health but serves to illustrate 194	
the many difficulties to overcome. 195	
A general theme of the comments was the need for inter-agency consultation, 196	
relationship building, planning and funding allocation, to deal with cross-sectoral 197	
differences before threats occur. Participants’ responses were analysed according 198	
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disciplinary background. Applying Fisher’s exact test (comparing agree vs. disagree 199	
and excluding the neither agree/disagree group),25 the only significant (p<0.05) 200	
difference was that participants from the animal health sector were more likely to see 201	
a focus on human, rather than animal or environmental health, as a barrier to an OH 202	
response. 203	
 204	
By R4 only 2 of 24 participants did not agree with the original statement [text box 2]; 205	
most believed that, despite differences or mutual cynicism, different sectors would set 206	
aside conflicting interests to mount an effective response to a significant zoonotic 207	
threat. However, many were convinced that a response could not be implemented 208	
rapidly and seamlessly, unless overall responsibility for infectious disease control and 209	
prevention in humans and animals were located within a single agency.   210	
 211	
Key Priorities in Developing a Plan of Action  212	
Previous studies have shown that different priorities create tensions between OH 213	
stakeholder groups.10,17 In R2 we asked panel members to rank 19 issues for 214	
developing an action plan in response to an unexpected threat.  Because our aim was 215	
to understand the key concerns and types of evidence needed to formulate a response 216	
at times of uncertainty, participants were asked to rank the issues, without contextual 217	
information, such as the nature or source of the pathogen or size of the outbreak. 218	
Rankings were determined by assigning a score equivalent to reverse rank (e.g. a 219	
score of 19 to items rated 1st); scores were multiplied by the number of participants 220	
who gave each rank and the overall ranking was determined by adding scores for each 221	
item. Table 3 shows the final rankings, which were presented to participants in R3 for 222	
comment.   223	
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The panel gave a strong endorsement to the top six items; at least 40% of participants 225	
ranked them in the top 5 and 70% in the top 10. Responses were a mix of ideal and 226	
pragmatic – burden of disease, costs of implementation and maintenance of services 227	
were key issues. In R3 participants’ comments on rankings indicated general 228	
agreement that human health, food security, resource availability and communication 229	
are appropriate primary concerns. Lower-ranked items were more evenly distributed, 230	
indicating more varied views about their importance. Several participants from both 231	
sectors expressed surprise at the relatively low rankings of social considerations, 232	
animal health and welfare and environmental health. Some were surprised at how 233	
high economic impacts and costs were ranked, commenting that it was not their role 234	
to prioritise according to economic factors. However, in subsequent rounds, it was 235	
suggested this was naïve; in the words of one participant: “Economic considerations 236	
come into everything that is done in health” (DP #33). Most agreed with the 237	
importance of proportionality such that economic factors were a consideration, but 238	
not the key consideration, in decision making. The plurality of views caused one 239	
participant to note:  240	
DP #5 - It depends on the particular situation: that's why we have, and need, 241	
consultative committees with broad representation to consider each 242	
situation.     243	
 244	
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Table S2 (supplementary data) provides a breakdown, by sector, of priorities and 245	
preferences from R3. While there was broad agreement on the top six priorities, there 246	
were some differences between sectors. Where there is a lack of evidence, animal 247	
health sector participants generally gave greater priority to economic and animal 248	
health concerns; whereas those from the human health sector were more likely to rank 249	
the effect on the emotional wellbeing and privacy of individuals and the risks of 250	
stigmatisation of those affected more highly.  251	
 252	
Several participants made the case that different situations would require different 253	
priorities; for example:    254	
DP #22 - Outbreak of rabies, Australian Bat Lyssa Virus (ABVL) or Japanese 255	
Encephalitis (JE) would have a localised impact in which the "top six' may be 256	
less important and issues 7 - 11 assume a higher importance. It is unlikely 257	
that rabies, ABLV or JE would impact on food supply or major economic 258	
impact yet the emotional psychological stress on individuals could be really 259	
significant. 260	
 261	
A common theme was that participants needed more information in order to make 262	
decisions about priorities.  Of this one participant noted:  263	
DP	#	52	–	While	I	agree	with	the	sentiments	expressed,	it	is	not	always	264	
possible	to	answer	all	these	questions	quickly	enough,	and	actions	may	265	
usually	need	to	be	undertaken	before	all	the	questions	can	be	answered	--	266	
especially	how	big	is	it	and	how	big	will	it	get,	which	may	not	be	known	267	
until	well	into	the	outbreak.			268	
 269	
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Given that there may be little existing evidence or experience when new threats - like 270	
SARS or bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) - emerge, key findings of this survey 271	
include the critical role of context in EID response-planning and policy decision-272	
making. Participants hoped that sectoral differences over second-order priorities 273	
would not interfere with these key goals; rather, that they be points of consultation to 274	
ensure that responses encompass different stakeholder perspectives. 	275	
 276	
DISCUSSION  277	
Our findings indicate high levels of support among Australian policy-makers and 278	
practitioners for an OH approach to zoonotic disease control and prevention, despite 279	
several points of disagreement. One key difference was whether OH should be 280	
defined as a means to integrate disciplinary practices or as a framework to understand 281	
linkages between separate disciplines. Proponents of both positions were found in 282	
both the main sectors, suggesting that the tension between integrationists and those 283	
who want to maintain disciplinary integrity is a personal rather than sectoral 284	
preference. Focussing on differences in the definition of OH may miss the point, but 285	
the complexities of EID control and prevention probably mean that an effective 286	
response requires genuine cross-sectoral integration and re-sectoring of some 287	
institutional and professional responsibilities.6 The results of this survey suggest that 288	
any such efforts are likely to meet with resistance within and across the relevant 289	
sectors.  290	
 291	
It is notable that not all of the barriers to the effective implementation of an inter-292	
agency plan identified by Delphi participants (Figure 2) were addressed by key 293	
priorities for action (Table 3).  This is likely to be because some of the barriers 294	
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identified simply don't have a practical action that can easily be included in a plan of 295	
action. That there is substantial overlap between the two lists in this study is actually 296	
positive sign that there are many practical and collaborative actions that can be taken 297	
in the event of an EID outbreak. Sectoral differences in participants’ responses tended 298	
to coalesce around the relative importance of each of the groups’ professional roles 299	
and responsibilities. The animal health sector, which traditionally works to maximise 300	
the value, utility and welfare of animals, emphasised economic and animal health 301	
considerations. Those working in the human health sector thought that ethical 302	
considerations and factors that affect epidemiological investigations should have 303	
higher priority. Differences in the goals and values of different sectors are not 304	
unexpected, but are likely to complicate cross-sectoral co-operation. Past experience 305	
with BSE and pandemic influenza H1N1 indicate that, in the face of scientific 306	
uncertainty and ethical ambiguity, these differences will be amplified. Consequently, 307	
sectoral interests and short-term political considerations will threaten efforts to devise 308	
effective long-term interventions.26,27  309	
 310	
There is some urgency to address disagreements revealed by this survey because calls 311	
for increased inter-sectoral co-operation, by public health practitioners and policy-312	
makers in Australia,28,29 and elsewhere, are not new.30 Unfortunately, past experience 313	
suggests that attempts to promote a cross-sectoral approach rarely move beyond 314	
rhetoric, even when driven by the best intentions and supported by substantial 315	
resources. The problem is that arguments focus on the likely benefits of collaboration 316	
rather than what needs to be done, organisationally and politically, to achieve the 317	
desired outcomes.29 Established ‘sectors’ have genealogies and rationalities shaped by 318	
social, political and administrative processes; as institutions, they are inherently and 319	
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structurally resistant to measures that divert resources and re-orient practices away 320	
from their own sectoral priorities. Consequently, even with commitment to 321	
information-sharing, through collaborative working groups and interdepartmental 322	
committees, inter-sectoral co-operation has rarely delivered the outcomes promised.  323	
Many recognise that integrationist reforms are likely to promote more effective cross-324	
sectoral collaboration,9,13 and OH opinion leaders are now advocating for the 325	
establishment of a supporting OH infrastructure comprised of: 326	
complex, polycentric organizational structures …  [that] rely on multiple, 327	
strong connections and coordinated activities across sectors.30  328	
Against this background, there is evidence that enthusiasm for OH in Australia is 329	
genuine rather than symbolic, as governments in recent years have moved towards 330	
aggregating responsibility for agriculture and environmental health under 331	
‘biosecurity’.  Initiatives such as the Australian Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy and 332	
Hendra Virus Interagency Technical Working Group are significant attempts to 333	
achieve collaboration between human and animal health sectors. This survey showed 334	
that there is considerable agreement among human and animal health practitioners 335	
and policymakers, including about the nature and scale of barriers to effective OH 336	
collaboration and the need for further work to explore their potential impacts. This 337	
suggests that implementation of an OH strategy, based on inter-sectoral co-operation, 338	
is eminently feasible. 339	
 340	
Strengths and Limitations 341	
The initial response to participant invitations was moderate, which was gratifying, 342	
given that our invitation was unsolicited. Retention of participants over successive 343	
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rounds was also moderate and the balance between members of different sectors 344	
remained constant. Because participation across different sectoral roles and 345	
jurisdictions remained relatively heterogeneous throughout the survey (Table 1), we 346	
believe the risk of selection bias due to participant withdrawal is minimal.	Moreover, 347	
allowing participants to express their views and comment on each other’s 348	
interpretation, via open-ended free text questions, over multiple survey rounds 349	
increased the reliability of the study and improved the validity of the results.  A 350	
limitation was the lack of a clearly identifiable environmental sector, which is likely 351	
to be an artefact of how the management of infectious disease risk in Australia is 352	
currently organised. 353	
 354	
Word count 355	
3,859 356	
  357	
17		
Reference 358	 1.	 CDC.	Operationalizing	“One	Health”:	a	policy	perspective—taking	stock	and	359	 shaping	an	implementation	roadmap:	meeting	overview.	Stone	Mountain,	360	 Georgia:	Centers	For	Disease	Control	and	Prevention,	2010.	361	 2.	 Morens	DM,	Fauci	AS.	Emerging	Infectious	Diseases	in	2012:	20	Years	after	362	 the	Institute	of	Medicine	Report.	mBio	2012;	3(6).	363	 3.	 Zinsstag	J,	Schelling	E,	Wyss	K,	Mahamat	B.	Potential	of	cooperation	between	364	 human	and	animal	health	to	strengthen	health	systems.	The	Lancet	2006;	365	
366(9503):	2142-5.	366	 4.	 Zinsstag	J,	Schelling	E,	Waltner-Toews	D,	Tanner	M.	From	“one	medicine”	to	367	 “one	health”	and	systemic	approaches	to	health	and	well-being.	Preventive	368	
Veterinary	Medicine	2011;	101(3–4):	148-56.	369	 5.	 Lee	K,	Brumme	ZL.	Operationalizing	the	One	Health	approach:	the	global	370	 governance	challenges.	Health	Policy	and	Planning	2013;	28(7):	778-85.	371	 6.	 Zinsstag	J,	Mackenzie	J,	Jeggo	M,	Heymann	D,	Patz	J,	Daszak	P.	Mainstreaming	372	 One	Health.	EcoHealth	2012;	9(2):	107-10.	373	 7.	 Allen-Scott	LK,	Buntain	B,	Hatfield	JM,	Meisser	A,	Thomas	CJ.	Academic	374	 Institutions	and	One	Health:	Building	Capacity	for	Transdisciplinary	375	 Research	Approaches	to	Address	Complex	Health	Issues	at	the	Animal–376	 Human–Ecosystem	Interface.	Academic	Medicine	2015;	90(7):	866.	377	 8.	 Hueston	W,	Appert	J,	Denny	T,	King	L,	Umber	J,	Valeri	L.	Assessing	global	378	 adoption	of	one	health	approaches.	EcoHealth	2013;	10(3):	228-33.	379	 9.	 Coker	R,	Rushton	J,	Mounier-Jack	S,	et	al.	Towards	a	conceptual	framework	380	 to	support	one-health	research	for	policy	on	emerging	zoonoses.	The	Lancet	381	
Infectious	Diseases	2011;	11(4):	326-31.	382	
18		
10.	 Okello	A,	Welburn	S,	Smith	J.	Crossing	institutional	boundaries:	mapping	the	383	 policy	process	for	improved	control	of	endemic	and	neglected	zoonoses	in	384	 sub-Saharan	Africa.	Health	policy	and	planning	2015;	30(6):	804-12.	385	 11.	 Ezenwa	VO,	Prieur-Richard	A-H,	Roche	B,	et	al.	Interdisciplinarity	and	386	 Infectious	Diseases:	An	Ebola	Case	Study.	PLoS	Pathog	2015;	11(8):	387	 e1004992.	388	 12.	 Zinsstag	J.	Convergence	of	ecohealth	and	one	health.	EcoHealth	2012;	9(4):	389	 371.	390	 13.	 Manlove	KR,	Walker	JG,	Craft	ME,	et	al.	“One	Health”	or	Three?	Publication	391	 Silos	Among	the	One	Health	Disciplines.	PLoS	Biol	2016;	14(4):	e1002448.	392	 14.	 Binot	A,	Duboz	R,	Promburom	P,	et	al.	A	framework	to	promote	collective	393	 action	within	the	One	Health	community	of	practice:	Using	participatory	394	 modelling	to	enable	interdisciplinary,	cross-sectoral	and	multi-level	395	 integration.	One	Health	2015;	1:	44-8.	396	 15.	 Gibbs	EPJ.	The	evolution	of	One	Health:	a	decade	of	progress	and	challenges	397	 for	the	future.	Veterinary	Record	2014;	174(4):	85-91.	398	 16.	 Okello	AL,	Bardosh	K,	Smith	J,	Welburn	SC.	One	Health:	Past	successes	and	399	 future	challenges	in	three	African	contexts.	PLoS	Negl	Trop	Dis	2014;	8(5):	400	 e2884.	401	 17.	 Chien	Y-J.	How	did	international	agencies	perceive	the	avian	influenza	402	 problem?	The	adoption	and	manufacture	of	the	‘One	World,	One	Health’	403	 framework.	Sociology	of	Health	&	Illness	2013;	35(2):	213-26.	404	 18.	 Stärk	KDC,	Arroyo	Kuribreña	M,	Dauphin	G,	et	al.	One	Health	surveillance	–	405	 More	than	a	buzz	word?	Preventive	Veterinary	Medicine	2015;	120(1):	124-406	 30.	407	
19		
19.	 Brookes	V,	Hernandez-Jover	M,	Black	P,	Ward	M.	Preparedness	for	emerging	408	 infectious	diseases:	pathways	from	anticipation	to	action.	Epidemiology	and	409	
infection	2015;	143(10):	2043-58.	410	 20.	 Häsler	B,	Gilbert	W,	Jones	BA,	Pfeiffer	DU,	Rushton	J,	Otte	MJ.	The	economic	411	 value	of	One	Health	in	relation	to	the	mitigation	of	zoonotic	disease	risks.		412	 One	Health:	The	Human-Animal-Environment	Interfaces	in	Emerging	413	 Infectious	Diseases:	Springer;	2012:	127-51.	414	 21.	 Ziglio	E.	The	Delphi	method	and	its	contribution	to	decision-making.	In:	415	 Adler	M,	Ziglio	E,	eds.	Gazing	Into	the	Oracle:	The	Delphi	Method	and	Its	416	 Application	to	Social	Policy	and	Public	Health.	London:	Jessica	Kingsley	417	 Publishers;	1996:	3-33.	418	 22.	 Jones	J,	Hunter	D.	Consensus	methods	for	medical	and	health	services	419	 research.	BMJ:	British	Medical	Journal	1995;	311(7001):	376.	420	 23.	 Gale	NK,	Heath	G,	Cameron	E,	Rashid	S,	Redwood	S.	Using	the	framework	421	 method	for	the	analysis	of	qualitative	data	in	multi-disciplinary	health	422	 research.	BMC	Medical	Research	Methodology	2013;	13:	117-.	423	 24.	 Keeney	S,	Hasson	F,	McKenna	HP.	A	critical	review	of	the	Delphi	technique	as	424	 a	research	methodology	for	nursing.	International	Journal	of	Nursing	Studies	425	 2001;	38(2):	195-200.	426	 25.	 Routledge	R.	Fisher's	Exact	Test.		Encyclopedia	of	Biostatistics:	John	Wiley	&	427	 Sons,	Ltd;	1998:	1519-23.	428	 26.	 Phillips	N,	Bridgeman	J,	Ferguson-Smith	M.	The	BSE	inquiry.	London:		429	 http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk	accessed	on	12	February	2012:	Stationery	430	 Office,	2000.	431	
20		
27.	 Rosella	LC,	Wilson	K,	Crowcroft	NS,	et	al.	Pandemic	H1N1	in	Canada	and	the	432	 use	of	evidence	in	developing	public	health	policies	–	A	policy	analysis.	Social	433	
Science	&	Medicine	2013;	83(0):	1-9.	434	 28.	 Baum	F.	The	new	public	health:	Oxford	University	Press;	2003.	435	 29.	 Degeling	P.	The	Significance	of	'Sectors'	in	Calls	for	Urban	Public	Health	436	 Intersectroralism:	an	Australian	perspective.	Policy	&	Politics	1995;	23(4):	437	 289-301.	438	 30.	Rüegg SR, McMahon BJ, Häsler B, Esposito R,  et al. A Blueprint to Evaluate 439	
One Health. Frontiers of Public Health 2017; 5 (20): doi: 440	
10.3389/fpubh.2017.00020 441	
	442	
 443	
  444	
21		
Table 1: Professional/employment characteristics and geographic locations of panel 
participants 
 
 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
 
n=52 n=40 n=34 n=24 
Response rate  62% 77% 85% 71% 
Employment setting 
    Federal government 7 (0.135)* 6 (0.15) 5 (0.147) 4 (0.167) 
Provincial governments 17 (0.323) 14 (0.35) 11 (0.323) 9 (0.375) 
Regional / Local health authorities 7 (0.135) 4 (0.1) 4 (0.117) 2 (0.083) 
NGO / Industry  6 (0.115) 5 (0.125) 4 (0.117) 1 (0.042) 
University  15 (0.288) 11 (0.275) 10 (0.294) 8 (0.333) 
     Geographic area  
    Federal / National 12 (0.231) 11 (0.275) 8 (0.235) 5 (0.208) 
NSW 13 (0.25) 10 (0.25) 9 (0.265) 7 (0.292) 
Victoria 8 (0.154) 5 (0.125) 5 (0.147) 4 (0.167) 
Queensland  6 (0.115) 3 (0.075) 3 (0.088) 3 (0.125) 
Western Australia  5 (0. 096) 4 (0.1) 3 (0.088) 0 
Northern Territory  3 (0.057) 3 (0.075) 2 (0.059) 2 (0.083) 
South Australia 2 (0.038) 2 (0.05) 2 (0.059) 1 (0.042) 
ACT 2 (0.038) 1 (0.025) 1 (0.029) 1 (0.042) 
Tasmania  1 (0.019) 1 (0.025) 1 (0.029) 1 (0.042) 
     Primary role / responsibility  
    Chief Medical / Veterinary Officers 6 (0.115) 4 (0.01) 3 (0.088) 2 (0.083) 
Directors of Health / Biosecurity agencies 11 (0.212) 10 (0.25) 9 (0.265) 7 (0.292) 
Public Health / Veterinary Officers 9 (0.173) 5 (0.125) 4 (0.117) 3 (0.125) 
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* Data in brackets are proportions of total in each category 445	
 446	
Table 2: Level of support for different definitions of One Health.                           447	
Data from rounds 3 & 4 448	
 449	
Statement Delphi Round 3  Delphi Round 4 
Human 
health 
sector 
(n=17) 
Animal 
health 
sector 
(n=17) 
Round 3  
Total  
(n=34) 
Human 
health 
sector 
(n=11) 
Animal 
health 
sector 
(n=13) 
Round 4 
Total 
(n=24) 
1 [A] 9 (0.52) 8 (0.46) 17 (0.50) 5 (0.45) 7 (0.54) 12 (0.50) 
2 [B] 4 (0.24) 3 (0.18) 7 (0.21) 0 3 (0.23) 3 (0.13) 
3 [D]  4 (0.24) 6 (0.36) 10 (0.29) 6 (0.55) 3 (0.23) 9 (0.37) 
* Data in brackets are proportions of total in each category 450	
 451	
Senior Policy Officer / Research Scientist 12 (0.231) 10 (0.25) 8 (0.235) 5 (0.208) 
Academic Clinician / Researcher 14 (0.269) 11 (0.275) 10 (0.294) 7 (0.292) 
     
Disciplinary / sectoral background     
Human Health 24 (0.462) 20 (0.50) 17 (0.5) 11 (0.458) 
Animal Health 28 (0.538) 20 (0.50) 17 (0.5) 13 (0.542) 
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Table	3:	Key	priorities	when	developing	a	plan	of	action	ranked	from	most	to	least	important.		Data	collected	in	round	2	(n=40).	 Overall 
ranking 
Rating 
score 
Rankings 
in 1st 
Quartile 
Rankings 
in 2nd 
Quartile 
Rankings 
in 3rd 
Quartile 
Rankings 
in 4th 
Quartile 
Impacts on human health 1 718 97.5% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
Availability of human and health resources for plan implementation 2 602 65.0% 27.5% 2.5% 5.0% 
Continuity of food supply and maintenance of essential services 3 571 57.5% 30.0% 5.0% 7.5% 
Public education about the risks faced by individuals and communities 4 545 50.0% 30.0% 17.5% 2.5% 
Economic impacts on individuals, businesses and governments 5 521 42.5% 37.5% 17.5% 2.5% 
The financial cost of implementing the plan 6 493 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 
Potential public reaction - including concerns about stigmatisation 7 428 10.0% 57.0% 30.0% 3.0% 
Ease of tracking exposed persons 8 419 27.5% 27.5% 30.0% 12.5% 
Welfare and health of animals 9 405 27.5% 27.5% 22.5% 12.5% 
Emotional/psychological stress on individuals 10 376 10.0% 37.5% 42.5% 10.0% 
The interests of other jurisdictions – [WHO, neighbouring states… etc.] 11 373 27.5% 35.0% 10.0% 27.5% 
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Confidentiality of those who are ill, being traced, or involved in decision making 12 355 10.0% 40.0% 32.5% 7.5% 
Impacts on the environment  13 313 12.5% 17.5% 37.5% 42.5% 
Australia's reputation 14 311 12.5% 22.5% 37.5% 32.5% 
The potential for research to generate valuable new knowledge  15 302 10.0% 25.0% 30.0% 35.0% 
Impacts on the freedom of individuals 16 284 0.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Impacts on tourism and travel 17 215 0.0% 12.5% 45.0% 47.5% 
Impacts on family cohesion 18 209 2.5% 10.0% 37.5% 50.0% 
Impacts on public transport 19 158 0.0% 10.0% 32.5% 37.5% 
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